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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
April Ramos contends the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress.
Specifically, she asserts that, in concluding there was reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic
stop and conduct sobriety tests, the district court improperly considered two facts which were not
known to the officer at the time he extended the traffic stop detention.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Henrie initiated a traffic stop on Ms. Ramos because he saw her driving 37 miles
per hour in a 30 mile-per-hour zone. (Tr., p.8, Ls.10-11.) As she began to pull over, Officer
Henrie saw her right front tire drive up on the curb before coming back down onto the roadway.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.12-14.) At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Henrie noticed that his
dash camera video showed that Ms. Ramos subsequently drove back up onto the curb a second
time as she stopped her car. (Tr., p.11, Ls.16-19.) However, he made it clear “that’s not
something I noticed on the traffic stop. That’s something I just noticed watching the video” from
his dash camera at the suppression hearing. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-8.)
As Officer Henrie approached the car, he saw Ms. Ramos with her hands out the window
and described them as “shaking a little bit.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.21-25.) The district court1 found that
appearance was the result of Ms. Ramos repeatedly and rapidly flicking a cigarette. (R., p.85.)
Nevertheless, Officer Henrie felt her behavior was odd, and so called for his partner to join him
at the scene. (Tr., p.22, Ls.12-17.) He knew his partner had a drug dog with him, but he did not
specifically request his partner deploy the dog. (Tr., p.34, Ls.3-18.)

1

While Judge Simpson presided over most of this case, Senior Judge Alan Stephens presided
over the suppression hearing and ruled on the motion. (See R., pp.43, 81, 94, 148.)
1

As the officer approached, Ms. Ramos began explaining that the reason she had hit the
curb was that she saw a cut out in the curb which she thought would lead into an area where she
could pull over, but she had been mistaken. (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-4; See generally Exhibit 1 (body
camera).)2 Officer Henrie testified that there is, indeed, such a cutout in that portion of the curb,
but that it leads into a fenced piece of private property. (Tr., p.15, Ls.6-9, p.16, Ls.7-12.) He
also noted that Ms. Ramos ultimately stopped at the entrance to a business’s parking lot a little
way beyond the private drive. (See Tr., p.12, L.8 - p.13, L.22.) He also testified Ms. Ramos was
not turning enough to appear to be starting a turn into the cutout. (Tr., p.36, Ls.12-16.)
Officer Henrie testified he recognized Ms. Ramos from “a handful” of prior encounters.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.14-19.) He also testified he was trained as a drug recognition expert. (Tr., p.5, L.24
- p.8, L.2.) He felt she was talking more rapidly than she did when she was sober, when she was
usually more relaxed. (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-10.) He also testified she would stop looking for her
identification and registration to answer his questions, which he felt showed an inability to divide
her attention like a sober person could. (Tr., p.21, Ls.1-22.) Officer Henrie testified that, as
Ms. Ramos was looking for her identification documents, he shined his flashlight toward her face
and noted that her pupils were dilated and did not constrict as he would have expected as the
light hit them. (Tr., p.20, Ls.12-24.)
Ms. Ramos ultimately provided her identification, explained she could not find the
registration, and admitted she was still trying to get insurance reinstated following a recent ticket.
(See Tr., p.30, Ls.12-18; Exhibit 1 (body camera).) Officer Henrie ordered Ms. Ramos to get out
2

The parties agreed that Exhibit 1 would contain several different video clips. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1724.) Specifically, there are videos from two different dash cameras (both contained in a single
video file in the folder named “L Henrie 1”) and one from Officer Henrie’s body camera (in the
folder named L Henrie 2). To avoid confusion, citations will indicate “(dash camera)” or “(body
camera).” Citations to the dash camera herein will only refer to the video from Camera 1. When
necessary, citations will include the relevant time stamp of the video clip being cited.
2

of the car. (Tr., p.19, Ls.14-15.) As she did so, Officer Henrie called in her identification
information. (Tr., p.25, Ls.18-21.) Within twenty to thirty seconds, dispatch returned, informing
the officer that Ms. Ramos was negative for warrants, though she did have warnings for prior
domestic violence and for fleeing officers. (Tr., p.25, L.22 - p.26, L.13; Exhibit 1 (dash camera),
~3:51; Exhibit 1 (body camera), ~2:55.)
Officer Henrie had Ms. Ramos move to the back of her car. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 (body
camera), ~2:55.) Officer Henrie told Ms. Ramos he was concerned she was impaired and began
asking questions about when she had last used drugs. (Exhibit 1 (body camera), ~3:20) He
testified that, during this time, Ms. Ramos was constantly moving, reaching up to her face, and
turning around. (Tr., p.25, Ls.3-9.) However, the officer admitted that all of the characteristics
Ms. Ramos displayed in this regard, apart from the dilated pupils, could be attributed to general
nervousness as easily as drug use. (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40, L.6.)
Officer Henrie decided to have Ms. Ramos perform field sobriety. (See, Tr., p.26, Ls.1415.) She passed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, though the officer noted some drugs do not
affect horizontal nystagmus.3 (Tr., p.26, Ls.19-24.) She also passed the one-leg stand, but failed
the walk-and-turn. (Tr., p.27, L.16 - p.28, L.19.) The officer also noted that Ms. Ramos’ pupils
never fully constricted during the stop. (See Tr., p.20, Ls.21-24.)
Upon completing the field sobriety tests, Officer Henrie told Ms. Ramos he needed to
follow up on the status of her other ticket in order to decide whether or not to cite her for the lack
of insurance. (Tr., p.28, L.24 - p.29, L.1.) As he started back to his car, he saw his partner
standing to the side with his dog. (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-3.) He asked whether the dog had alerted on
the car, and his partner said the dog had done so. (Tr., p.29, Ls.3-4; see Exhibit 1 (body camera),

3

Officer Henrie did not check for vertical nystagmus. (See generally Exhibit 1 (body camera).)
3

~9:55.) Specifically, while Officer Henrie was conducting the sobriety tests, the dog alerted on
the driver’s door. (Tr., p.44, Ls.3-10.) Based on the fruits of the ensuing search of the car, the
State charged Ms. Ramos with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (See R., pp.31-32.)
Ms. Ramos filed a motion to suppress all the evidence found in the car arguing that
Officer Henrie did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety tests, and so, he
had unlawfully extended the detention by conducting those tests. (R., pp.48-52.) The district
court disagreed. (R., pp.83-95.) In its findings of fact, the district court specifically found:
“Officer Henrie shined his flashlight into [Ms.] Ramos’s eyes and noted that her pupils
constricted very slowly. He testified that [Ms.] Ramos’s eyes never fully constricted, even
during his later field sobriety testing.” (R., p.86.) It considered that factual finding in explaining
why it concluded the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety tests.
(R., p.92 (“He noticed that her pupils did not constrict completely to light.”).) It also specifically
considered the fact that “[Ms.] Ramos drove the wheel back up on the curb a second time” in that
evaluation. (R., p.92.) Because it concluded the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the
field sobriety tests, it held the officer had not unlawfully extended the stop, and so, denied the
motion. (R., pp.93-95.)
Ms. Ramos subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea whereby she pled to the
methamphetamine charge and reserved her right to appeal the decision to deny her motion to
suppress.

(R., p.123, Tr., p.65, Ls.10-24.)

In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the

paraphernalia charge and to follow the recommendations of the presentence investigation, but to
not recommend more than a period of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.123.) The presentence
investigator ultimately concluded Ms. Ramos was a moderate candidate for probation. (Conf.

4

Docs., p.19.) Accordingly, both parties recommended the district court place Ms. Ramos on
probation. (Tr., p.79, Ls.8-11, p.82, Ls.7-11.) The district court followed that recommendation,
imposing a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, which it suspended for a fiveyear term of probation. (Tr., p.87, L.17 - p.88, L.3.)
Ms. Ramos filed a notice of appeal timely from the resulting judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.146, 154.)

5

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by considering facts not known the officer at the time when
evaluating whether he had reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop to conduct field sobriety
tests.

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Considering Facts Not Known The Officer At The Time When
Evaluating Whether He Had Reasonable Suspicion To Extend A Traffic Stop To Conduct Field
Sobriety Tests
A.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate courts use a bifurcated

standard of review. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016). The appellate court will defer to
the district court’s findings of fact, but it will review the application of legal principles to those
facts de novo. Id.

B.

The District Court Improperly Considered Two Factors Which The Record Clearly
Shows Were Not Known To The Officer At The Time Of The Challenged Detention
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 524 (1986).
Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608.
Such seizures are only reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “so long as the seizing officer
had reasonable suspicion that a [traffic] violation had occurred.” Id. That also means “the
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.” Rodriguez v. United States,
575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). In other words, “[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the purpose of
the stop, it may last no longer than necessary to effectuate that purpose,” and “[a]uthority for the

7

seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Id. (internal quotation and alterations omitted).
As a result, “unless some new reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises to justify the
seizure’s new purpose, a seized party’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the original
purpose of the stop is abandoned.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 609. This rule prevents temporarily
abandoning the mission of the stop as much as completely abandoning it: “The critical question,
then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket . . . but whether
conducing the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357.
Any period of detention not justified by reasonable suspicion constitutes a violation; there is no
de minimus exception in this regard. Linze, 161 Idaho at 609 n.2.
Here, since Officer Henrie was not working on a citation for speeding and was not
conducting the necessary investigation to determine whether to cite Ms. Ramos for not having
insurance while he was conducting the field sobriety tests, the field sobriety tests added time to
the stop. As such, during that portion of the detention, he temporarily abandoned the mission of
the stop. Therefore, there had to be reasonable suspicion to justify that portion of the detention
in order for it to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
As the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear, “[w]hether an officer possessed reasonable
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before
the time of the [detention].” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (emphasis added). As
such, “we must look to the reasonableness of the government’s actions considering ‘all the
circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ In doing
so, we freeze-frame the factual circumstances to focus on what the officer knew at the time of the
alleged violation.” State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 908 (2019) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
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1, 19 (1968)) (emphasis from Maxim). Therefore, it is impermissible for the district court to
consider facts which were not known to the officer at the time in evaluating whether the officer
had a reasonable suspicion to justify extending a traffic stop beyond its mission.
And yet, that is precisely what the district court did in this case. Specifically, the district
court considered the fact (1) that Ms. Ramos’ car had driven up on the curb a second time
(R., pp.91-92.), and (2) that Ms. Ramos’ pupils did not fully constrict during the field sobriety
tests in determining there was reasonable suspicion to justify extending the scope of the traffic
stop. (R., pp.86, 91-92.) However, the record is clear that Officer Henrie did not know about
either of those facts at the moment he departed from the mission of the stop.
With respect to Ms. Ramos driving up on the curb a second time, Officer Henrie himself
repeatedly admitted that he was not aware of that fact while he was engaged in the traffic stop:
you can actually -- I hadn’t notice[d] it before, but you can actually see her pull
up on the curb a little bit the second time.
...
So watching this video, you can see where it looks like she kind of rests her right
front tire upon [sic] the sidewalk as she comes to a stop. You can see her car
move up and down. But that’s not something I noticed on the traffic stop. That’s
something I just noticed watching the video.
(Tr., p.11, Ls.16-19; Tr., p.14, Ls.3-8 (emphasis added).) Since the officer’s testimony makes it
affirmatively clear that he did not know about that fact at the time of the detention in question, it
could not contribute to the determination of reasonable suspicion. See Maxim, 165 Idaho at 908
(holding it was not proper for the district court to have considered the fact that the defendant had
waived his Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to a probation agreement because the officer did
not know about that wavier at the time of the search in question).

9

Similarly, it is axiomatic that any observations the officer made during the departure from
the mission of the stop cannot be used to retroactively justify the decision to depart from the
mission of the stop. See id. That is because the picture being evaluated for reasonable suspicion
is frozen before such facts have happened. See id. Therefore, what Ms. Ramos’ pupils did
during the field sobriety tests cannot contribute to whether there was reasonable suspicion to
conduct those tests in the first place.
Since the district court erroneously included those two facts in its analysis of whether
there was reasonable suspicion to justify extending the detention, that decision is tainted and
should be reversed. Compare id. (holding the fact that the defendant had a probation waiver did
not save an otherwise-unlawful search and seizure the officers did not know about the probation
waiver at the time); see also State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924-25 & n.4 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding
there was not reasonable suspicion when most of the factors observed could be equally attributed
to general nervousness, which is of limited value in establishing reasonable suspicion).

CONCLUSION
Ms. Ramos respectfully requests this Court vacate her conviction and reverse the order
denying her motion to suppress.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2021.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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